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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
BILLY ARELLANO, : Case No. 970347-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
ESTABLISH ARELLANO'S KNOWING AND INTENTIONAL 
POSSESSION OF COCAINE. 
A. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions Directly 
Addressing The Issue Of This Case Is Relevant To 
This Court's Analysis. 
The State asserts that circumstantial evidence establishes 
that Arellano knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine, noting 
that the "timing, location, and method of transfer [] established 
a preplanned scheme." State's Brief ("S.B.") at 12-19. However, 
Arellano's fleeting, physical contact with the envelope, without 
other manifestations of his dominion and control over the cocaine 
within, did not sufficiently establish knowing and intentional 
possession. See, e.g.. United States v. Kitchen, 57 F.3d 516, 522, 
reh'cr denied, (7th Cir. 1995) (2-3 second physical contact with 
cocaine did not establish intent to possess absent other 
circumstances to that effect); Loudermilk v. State, 523 N.E.2d 769, 
771 (Ind. App. 1988) (no possession where defendant held bag of 
marijuana for seven seconds but did not otherwise show intent to 
possess); see Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at 15-19. 
The State bases its claim upon the well-founded principle 
that evidence of intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof and 
must be inferred from the given circumstances. See S.B. 13 (citing 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991); State v. Emmett. 839 
P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992); State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 1014 (Utah 
1986); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah App. 1990)). To this 
end, the State dismisses as "inapposite" Arellano's reference to 
Kitchen, Loudermilk, and similar case law from other jurisdictions 
which hold that momentary physical contact with a controlled 
substance, without more, does not establish knowing and intentional 
possession. See S.B. 13. 
Such case law is relevant, however. Arellano agrees that 
intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and cites Utah 
case law to that effect. See A.B. 15. Nonetheless, case law from 
other jurisdictions is instructive since Utah cases, including 
those cited by the State, do not squarely address the facts and 
issue of this case, i.e., to what extent intent to possess may be 
inferred from brief contact with contraband without departing from 
the due process requirement that prohibited conduct be defined and 
that the government prove each element of an offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See A.B. 14, 18-19 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 
461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). 
Utah courts frequently look to other jurisdictions for 
guidance where, as here, the issue is novel and where outside case 
law is consistent with the analytical framework provided for under 
Utah law. See, e.g. , State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1156 (Utah 
2 
App. 1994)(citing federal case law in interpreting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-1); State v. Archuleta, 857 P.2d 234, 240 (Utah 
1993) (looking to other jurisdictions in determining whether common 
law grants access to documents in criminal matters); Provo City v. 
Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 363 (Utah App. 1992) (relying on other 
jurisdictions in assessing stop under Fourth Amendment). In fact, 
the analysis under Kitchen and Loudermilk comports with the 
existing framework employed in Utah; the additional manifestations 
of intent required under Kitchen and Loudermilk fall under the 
rubric of "circumstantial proof" of knowing and intentional 
possession provided for in Utah. Accordingly, this Court may look 
to cases like Kitchen and Loudermilk without departing from Utah 
precedent. 
B. Arellano's Culpable Intent Is Not Established 
By The Fact That He Immediately Dropped The 
Envelope When Summoned By The Prison Guards. 
In explaining how the circumstances establish culpable 
intent, the State relies, in part, upon the fact that Arellano 
immediately dropped the envelope when summoned by the prison guards 
and that such was a sign of his "guilty knowledge." See S.B. 18. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, any reasonable person would drop 
the envelope out of nervousness when called upon by an officer, 
especially in a heavily policed environment like a prison. See 
A.B. 19-20. Nervous behavior upon an officer's unsolicited 
attention is as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt. Id. 
(citing State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah App. 1992)). 
Moreover, under facts far more incriminating than those 
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involved here, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that flight or 
concealment is not evidence of "premeditation or intent. Flight or 
concealment shows the guilty conscience of the accused as a result 
of the crime committed. It does not show the state of mind prior 
to the criminal act or event." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 
(Utah 1991) (fact that baby was found dead, wrapped in cloth and 
left in marsh, did not establish defendant's guilt for murder); see 
also State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983) (fact that defendant 
fled when called by officer did not establish his guilt for 
robbery) . Accordingly, " [o]ther evidence of the defendant's intent 
must be present in the record to support the jury's verdict." Id. 
at 790. The fact that Arellano let go of the envelope merely 
establishes that, based on the officers' swift response, he 
understood that something was wrong with the envelope and dropped 
it accordingly. This fact, however, in and of itself, does not 
establish his "guilty knowledge." 
II. ARELLANO MADE A CREDIBLE SHOWING OF NEED AND 
PREJUDICE WARRANTING A CONTINUANCE OR EXCLUSION OF 
TESTIMONY WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVIDE TIMELY 
NOTICE OF ITS EXPERT WITNESS. 
The State asserts on two grounds that Arellano was not 
entitled to either a continuance or exclusion of the expert 
testimony of Jennifer McNair ("McNair"), the State crime lab 
technician who proposed to identify as cocaine the substance found 
within the envelope and who prepared a toxicology report to this 
effect. See S.B. 20-27. 
First, the State claims that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
77-17-13 (1995), Arellano had adequate notice of McNair's 
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testimony: Arellano received McNair's toxicology report 
identifying her as the preparing technician almost two months 
before trial, and such report (which he did not stipulate to) was 
the only evidence of a "controlled substance" for purposes of a 
charge of possession within a correctional facility. See S.B. 20-
21. Second, assuming the State did violate section 77-17-13, the 
State asserts that Arellano failed to demonstrate sufficient need 
of or prejudice meriting exclusion or a continuance. Id. at 25. 
Each point shall be addressed in turn. 
A. The State Did Not Satisfy The Notice 
Requirements Of Section 77-17-13 By Merely 
Providing The Toxicology Report To Arellano. 
Contrary to the State's first challenge, the bare 
toxicology report did not constitute adequate notice under section 
77-17-13. The State quotes statutory language out of context in 
stating that "information provided by the proponent of expert 
testimony must be 'sufficient to give the opposing party adequate 
notice to prepare to meet the testimony.'" S.B. 23 (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1) (b) ) . That portion of the statute, 
subsection (1) (b) , refers specifically to the report to be prepared 
by the expert herself and provided to the opposing party so as to 
inform the opposing party of the substance of the proposed 
testimony. In situations where such a report is not yet available, 
the legislature deemed it appropriate that a party may temporarily 
provide a written synopsis "sufficient to give the opposing party 
notice to prepare to meet the testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-
13(1) (b) . 
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This language relied upon by the State, however, cannot 
substitute for the remainder of a party's duty under subsection 
(1)(a) of the same statute, which is to provide the name, address 
and resume of the proposed expert within thirty days of trial. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (a) ("Notice shall include the name and 
address of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of 
the expert's report"). Where the prosecution failed to notify 
Arellano that McNair would testify within the thirty day time 
limit, and likewise failed to provide McNair's resume to Arellano, 
it violated its statutory duty. R. 118 [17, 23] . Accordingly, the 
State's assertion that Arellano received adequate notice required 
under section 77-17-13 is incorrect. 
B. Arellano Demonstrated Need And Prejudice 
Meriting The Statutory Remedy Of Either A 
Continuance Or Exclusion Of Proposed Testimony 
Pursuant To Section 77-17-13. 
The State contends that Arellano has not demonstrated a 
"legitimate need for a continuance" or sufficient prejudice 
warranting either a continuance or exclusion of untimely disclosed 
expert testimony pursuant to section 77-17-13. See S.B. at 22-26; 
see also State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App. 1997) 
(including need and prejudice among factors for consideration in 
determining when continuance or exclusion is warranted under § 77-
17-13) . 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny either a 
continuance or exclusion of evidence under section 77-17-13 is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Begishe, 937 P. 2d at 530. 
However, in cases involving untimely disclosed evidence, the scope 
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of this standard of review is limited by the fact that the record 
necessarily lacks information which would enable reviewing courts 
to assess the "nature or magnitude of the resulting prejudice to 
the defense." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). As 
noted by the Knight Court, 
[W] hen . . . the error consists of the 
prosecutions's failure to provide a defendant with 
inculpatory evidence, the record does not provide 
much assistance in discovering the nature or 
magnitude of the resulting prejudice to the 
defense. The record cannot reveal how knowledge 
of this evidence would have affected the actions 
of defense counsel, either in preparing for trial 
or in presenting the case to the jury. To a large 
extent this leaves the reviewing court to 
speculate whether, absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the defense would have 
adduced other evidence which, when considered in 
light of the evidence actually presented, would 
have produced a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt. 
Id. at 920-21. 
Noting "the difficulties posed by the record's silence in 
cases involving a wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory 
evidence," the Knight Court determined that a defendant need not 
establish prejudice conclusively, but only make a "credible 
argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense." 
Id. at 921 (finding credible defendant's showing of prejudice due 
to prosecutor's failure to disclose witnesses). A "credible 
argument" means that the defendant has demonstrated prejudice 
sufficient to "erode[] a reviewing court's confidence in the 
outcome of [the] trial" by a "likelihood greater than fifty 
7 
percent." Id. at 919-20.x 
Under the foregoing standard of review, Arellano has made 
a credible showing of need, as well as sufficient prejudice to 
merit either a continuance or exclusion of McNair's expert 
testimony. 
With regard to need, Arellano asserts that a continuance 
would have allowed him to explore McNair's proposed testimony as it 
relates to chain of custody and her qualifications to test the 
substance. R. 119 [20] ; A.B. 36. The State counters that Arellano 
failed to demonstrate a "legitimate need for a continuance" since 
he did not contest either chain or McNair's qualifications at trial 
or on appeal and that, in any event, "the chain of custody issue 
ha[s] nothing to do with [McNair's] testimony that the substance 
she tested was cocaine." S.B. 22, 24-25. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, McNair's 
qualifications to conduct the testing and her testimony regarding 
chain of custody are pertinent to Arellano's defense. As discussed 
in Arellano's opening brief, McNair and the prison guards each gave 
1
 The State asserts that Arellano defeats his own "matter-
of-law" argument in briefing prejudice in his opening brief. See 
S.B. 21-22. However, Arellano's "matter-of-law" argument, see 
A.B. 25-28, is consistent with the abuse-of-discretion standard 
of review to the extent that a trial court is limited in its 
discretion to act when one party fails to disclose inculpatory 
information. The trial court may either grant a continuance or 
exclude the proposed evidence; other action or inaction amounts 
to an abuse of discretion under section 77-17-13. The fact that 
a reviewing court's ability to assess prejudice is limited by the 
silence of the record underscores how, as a matter of law, a 
party becomes entitled to either a continuance or exclusion of 
testimony upon another party's failure to timely disclose 
pursuant to section 77-17-13. 
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differing testimony as to the color of the substance. See A.B. 36. 
Moreover, the initial test results identified the substance as 
methaqualone whereas later test results showed the substance to be 
cocaine. Id. Hence, legitimate questions as to chain of custody 
and/or McNair's qualifications to conduct accurate testing exist. 
Ultimately, these questions go to the identity of the substance 
itself, an element of the crime of possession within a correctional 
facility that must be established in order to convict Arellano. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1997) (making it "unlawful: 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally possess . . . a 
controlled substance . . . [within] any correctional facility"). 
However, Arellano was denied an adequate opportunity to explore 
those questions at trial when he was compelled to cross-examine 
McNair without time to prepare his defense. 
With regard to prejudice, the State asserts that Arellano 
was not prejudiced by the denial of the continuance or alternative 
exclusion of McNair's testimony since he could have reasonably 
anticipated that she would testify. Specifically, the State notes 
that McNair's name was on the toxicology report that Arellano 
received two months prior to trial; that the report was the only 
evidence identifying the substance as cocaine for purposes of a 
charge of possession within a correctional facility; that Arellano 
should have known that the State would be required to present 
accompanying expert testimony at trial since he did not stipulate 
to the report at the preliminary hearing; and that in any event 
rebuttal expert testimony would not have changed the outcome of the 
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trial in light of other evidence presented by the State. See S.B. 
24-26. 
Contrary to the State's characterization of the evidence, 
McNair's report was not the only evidence presented by the State 
identifying the substance within the envelope. Other evidence 
proffered by the State included the testimony of Mike Spilker, an 
evidence specialist for the Department of Corrections, who 
conducted a field test which established that the substance was 
cocaine. In addition, Sergeant White testified that another field 
test, administered by Lieutenant Haverneck, identified the 
substance as methaqualone. 119 [47-49, 140, 143, 150]. 
Accordingly, the State's assertion that Arellano should 
have prepared to meet McNair's testimony since it was the only 
evidence of substance identity is not well founded. Given the 
other evidence identifying a "controlled substance" for purposes of 
the possession charge, Arellano displayed due diligence in 
investing his time and resources in meeting the aforementioned 
testimony, especially where the State did not timely verify that it 
would additionally call McNair pursuant to its statutory duty. See 
A.B. 33-34; see also Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530 (defendant reasonably 
relied upon statutory assurance pursuant to § 77-17-13 in 
determining that State would notify if intending to present 
evidence). 
The State further challenges Arellano's showing of 
prejudice on the basis that a rebuttal expert would not materially 
enhance Arellano's defense that he did not recognize the cocaine 
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within the envelope when he picked it up given the testimony of 
other officers who stated that the amount involved was minute and 
not discernible to the naked eye. See S.B. 24-26. 
The State underestimates the impact of McNair's testimony. 
McNair corroborated previous officer testimony to the extent that 
she identified the substance as cocaine and stated that it weighed 
approximately fifty milligrams. R. 119 [166-67] . However, McNair's 
testimony also led juror's beyond to the conclusion that the amount 
involved was nonetheless more than "residue." R. 119 [166-68]. 
McNair described the amount as a "pinch of flour" and thus "easy to 
see and recognize as an amount of something." R. 119 [167] . 
Utah courts have long recognized the tendency of jurors to 
give greater weight to expert opinion than to other witness 
testimony. See, e.g., State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 
1989); State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 941-42 (Utah App. 1990); State 
v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 903 n.4 (Utah App. 1996). By the same 
token, the testimony of McNair, the only testifying expert in this 
case, could have resolved the juror's minds to the conclusion that 
Arellano must have known that the envelope he picked up contained 
cocaine, i.e., a recognizable "amount of something", especially 
where the balance of the evidence concerning his knowing and 
intentional possession of the cocaine within the sealed envelope is 
ambiguous. See A.B. Point I, 12-24; see also Knight, 734 P.2d at 
921 (recognizing increased risk of prejudice where surprise 
testimony is "pivotal"). 
Where Arellano was denied either a continuance during which 
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he could adequately prepare to meet McNair's testimony, or 
exclusion of the testimony altogether, the outcome of his trial was 
likely impacted to his detriment by her expert opinion. The 
prejudice to Arellano may not be conclusively apparent. 
Nonetheless, where the evidence of Arellano's guilt was otherwise 
in question and McNair's expert opinion suggested that the quantity 
of cocaine was definitely recognizable to Arellano as "an amount of 
something," it should not be presumed that Arellano's defense was 
unaffected by his inability to prepare and meet such evidence. As 
noted by the Knight Court: 
We cannot determine with any certainty from the 
record whether, absent the prosecutor's 
nondisclosures, the defense would have been better 
prepared to meet the [] testimony. However, the 
contention that the defense was caught off-guard 
and was denied sufficient time to explore ways of 
meeting the [] testimony rings true, and we 
certainly cannot say that advance notice would not 
have led to the introduction of other evidence 
that would have undermined their statements. 
Moreover, . . . the [] testimony was apparently 
pivotal to the jury's conviction of Knight. . . . 
Given the centrality of this testimony, the 
possible denial of adequate opportunity to meet it 
assumes heightened importance when evaluating 
whether the defense might have been impaired. 
Id. at 921. The likelihood of prejudice in this case is further 
underscored by the fact that McNair's testimony was that of an 
expert. "[A]ppellate courts are reluctant to find errors harmless 
when they concern opinions given by experts given . . . that jurors 
tend to give great weight to such testimony." Jacques, 924 P. 2d at 
903 n.4. 
The prejudice to Arellano is not mitigated by the fact that 
he was able to cross-examine McNair since his cross-examination was 
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unprepared. Knight, 734 P.2d at 922 (finding prejudice although 
defendant "vigorously" cross-examined surprise witnesses). "We do 
not know what additional impeachment evidence might have been 
submitted to the jury if the defense had seen the [witnesses] 
statements before trial and had prepared to discredit [them]. We 
cannot presume that the events at trial would have been 
unaffected." Id. 
Since Arellano has made a credible showing of prejudice, 
the State must establish that "there is no reasonable likelihood 
that absent the error, the outcome of trial would have been more 
favorable for the defendant." Id. at 921; see also Becrishe, 937 
P. 2d at 531 n.5. The State has not addressed this issue in its 
response brief, excusing itself from its duty based on its own 
assessment that Arellano did not adequately demonstrate prejudice 
in the first place. See S.B. 26 n.10. The State, therefore, has 
failed to meet its burden on appeal. Where Arellano demonstrated 
prejudice and the State has not refuted this showing, Arellano is 
entitled to either a continuance or exclusion of McNair's testimony 
pursuant to section 77-17-13 and Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530-31. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Arellano requests this Court to 
reverse his conviction for insufficient evidence. In the event 
that this Court decides that sufficient evidence exists, Arellano 
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded 
for a new trial due to the State's untimely notice regarding its 
expert witness. 
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